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"Boots on the Ground:" A Lesson Relearned?
The huge cost in U.S. lives and money caused by the U.S. involvement in the Iraqi insurgency have caused many, including President Obama to conclude that we did not use our military wisely and should not do this again. 1 The costs of putting U.S.
"Boots on the Ground" in a foreign counterinsurgency (COIN) are too high while the chances for success are too low. This is the same lesson learned from Vietnam yet it did not preclude the United States from deploying large quantities of troops to combat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2 This leads us to ask two questions. Is the United States destined to continue to be involved in counterinsurgencies in the future? If so, is there a better way of dealing with a foreign counterinsurgency than putting U.S. "Boots on the Ground"?
It is unlikely that the United States will have a choice but to involve itself in COIN operations in the future. 3 As the self-appointed 'Policeman of the World' with a large forward presence, the United States military is globally engaged on a scale unheard of prior to World War II. With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, the United States has an overwhelming superiority of nuclear and conventional forces "which has driven almost all potential opponents to embrace terrorism and insurgency as their only viable theory for victory." 4 Therefore, unless the United States changes its approach and withdraws from its role as "Policeman of the World," it is likely to be involved in future counterinsurgency operations in one form or another.
This brings us to the second question. Is there a better way of dealing with a foreign counterinsurgency than putting U.S. "Boots on the Ground"? The answer is The results will speak for themselves and emphatically proclaim that U.S. "Boots on the Ground" in a foreign counterinsurgency is fraught with problems and should be avoided if at all possible in favor of building the partnership capacity of the host nation.
Although U.S. "Boots on the Ground" can provide tactical and operational advantages that help to stabilize a counterinsurgency, the risks and disadvantages will almost always outweigh the benefits. "Boots on the Ground" will cost more in U.S. lives, wealth 3 and prestige and usually ends up being a detriment to the long-term success of the COIN campaign.
Before continuing, it is important to define "Boots on the Ground." For the purpose of this paper, "Boots on the Ground" refers to large quantities of U.S. troops on foreign soil directly engaged in COIN operations. It does not refer to U.S. troops engaged in BPC activities such as training and advising HN troops.
Colombian Counterinsurgency
The Mobility is a key aspect in fighting a counterinsurgency. 21 The counterinsurgent forces must provide security for the entire country, while the insurgents can pick and choose where they will strike. Therefore, the counterinsurgent forces cannot concentrate at anyone area but must be able to rapidly move forces to counter and react to insurgent operations. In addition, offensive strikes against insurgents are frequently based on intelligence that pinpoints the insurgents' location. This intelligence SOF without any degradation of capability.
27
Of all the training provided to the Colombian security forces, human rights training probably received the most emphasis. 28 The Colombian military had a long 34 The operation rescued 15 high-profile hostages from the FARC; many of whom had been held for eight years. The hostages included a Colombian Presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt, and three American contractors. The
Colombians had located the hostages months prior to the rescue operation partially with the assistance of U.S. ISR assets. 35 They had planned a joint SOF operation using HUMINT assets that had penetrated the FARC years in advance. These HUMINT assets convinced the FARC jailers that their commander required the movement of the hostages by helicopter to another location. Helicopter assets were painted to look like Venezuelan counterparts, which had moved FARC prisoners previously. The helicopters landed in a pre-coordinated location with unarmed Colombian military imitating medics, aircrew and a reporter. The hostages were handcuffed and loaded onto the helicopter along with two insurgents. Once airborne, the insurgents were 11 overpowered and the hostages were taken to safety. In the event of a failure of the primary plan, 39 helicopters and 2,000 Colombian troops were on alert.
Although the United States provided over 8 billion dollars to the Colombian COIN campaign, the Colombians did all the heavy lifting. 36 Between 2000 to 2009, the Colombian government tripled their defense budget to 12 billion dollars and provided the overarching strategy to conduct this campaign. 37 This was their war and they wanted to keep it that way. 38 By restricting the U.S. military to 800 uniformed personnel incountry, Plan Colombia ensured that the United States remained in a support role. 39 President Uribe was very aware of the dangers of the conflict becoming "America's War." 40 He was concerned that the Colombian people, government and particularly security forces became and remained engaged and knew that this was their war to win. To this end, he levied a war tax that particularly reached into the pocketbooks of the wealthy Colombians and tied them to the COIN campaign like never before. 41 To engage the poor, he expanded security to previously ungoverned regions and established social programs throughout the country that intricately linked the masses with the success of the COIN campaign as well. 44 However, he didn't send these forces to the many ungoverned and lawless areas of the country until the government was prepared to hold the territory and provide social services. In this way, he managed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Colombian people.
As the Colombian military and police began to provide security without corruption, they too began to gain legitimacy with the Colombian people. As previously mentioned, the small U.S. military presence not only improved the Colombian military's capabilities and professionalism but also directly contributed to an increase in public confidence. 45 In contrast, the danger of having U. By definition, the successful conclusion of a COIN campaign is conditions based not based on an arbitrary timeline. 47 Any limits set on its duration other than success, necessarily contribute to its unsuccessful conclusion. Furthermore, involvement in a counterinsurgency is likely to be long and protracted. 48 JP 3-24 tells us that, "Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment." 49 One of the lessons learned from the U.S. Army's study on the Colombian insurgency was that, "Smaller is better: A small footprint, limited resources, low profile, and some successes increase the likelihood for a long-term US involvement." 50 Cong. However, due to U.S. public dismay over the large scale bloodshed during this offensive, the war was lost in the minds of the American public. This not only led to the eventual announcement that the U.S. would pull out but it led the insurgents and North
Vietnamese to take heart and adjust their strategy to wait until the U.S. left. Although, the Tet offensive was a tactical disaster for the insurgents it is considered the watershed event that turned the tide of the war in the insurgents favor due to the influence of U.S. public opinion. 51 The U.S. experience in Colombia since the inception of Plan Colombia shows the effects of providing small quantities of troops with moderate quantities of resources to build the partnership capacity of a nation involved in a messy insurgency. BPC provided Colombia the assistance it needed to fill in the gaps in capability while not detracting from the Colombian's own sense of responsibility to shoulder the burden of winning the counterinsurgency. It did just enough to enhance the legitimacy of the Colombian military and its government without providing the insurgents a rally cry against foreign military intervention. The small footprint of the U.S. military also kept the attention of the U.S. public to a minimum which allowed the politicians to be more concerned about success than reelection.
Iraqi Counterinsurgency
The Iraqi deaths. 57 The United States responded in 2007 by announcing a new strategy which included a surge of U.S. troops to Iraq which brought the total number to a peak of 168,000. 58 General David Patraeus led the surge and by most accounts achieved remarkable success in lowering the level of violence. 59 However, by the end of the surge in 2008, the levels of violence had still only been reduced to the levels at the start of 2006 which were much higher than in 2004. 60 As Iraqi security forces gained in numbers and capability, the United States role in the counterinsurgency was gradually reduced. Mounting political pressure both within the United States and Iraq led to the departure of U.S. troops in December of 2011. 61 The Iraqi conflict cost the United States the lives of over 4,000 U.S. troops and over 30,000 wounded. 62 In addition, the United States spent over 800 billion dollars in direct costs with indirect costs likely to drive the price tag much higher. 63 This spending was a direct contributor to the current U.S. financial crisis. 64 On top of this, the prestige of the United States took a pummeling in the international arena. After the rapid and decisive overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Although the Iraqi counterinsurgency is very different than the Colombian counterinsurgency and the reasons for putting or not putting "Boots on the Ground" are not comparable, the effects of having or not having "Boots on the Ground" can be compared. Therefore, as this paper has already looked at the Colombian conflict without U.S. "Boots on the Ground," it will now look at the effects of having "Boots on the Ground" in Iraq.
The main benefit of having U.S. "Boots on the Ground" in Iraq was that it provided an immediate force-in-being to project power and provide security. After the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi security forces, there was no one else to fill this void. The U.S.
military provided mobility, firepower and unmatched ISR to name just a few capabilities.
By all accounts, the U.S. military was and is a first rate military trained to the best standards as it had just proven in overrunning Saddam Hussein's military. However, instead of filling in the gaps of Iraqi security forces' capabilities, the U.S. military had to fill all the gaps themselves.
This created multiple problems for the U.S. military. First, it lacked sufficient numbers to provide security for all of Iraq. Second, although strong in ISR, HUMINT is usually more important in a counterinsurgency. As previously mentioned, HUMINT usually is better obtained by HN troops as they understand the environment and culture and can blend in with the insurgents. Third, a lack of sufficient numbers coupled with a lack of local knowledge led to an overreliance on firepower.
COIN operations place a premium on security. The security has to be enduring and not momentary. Therefore, a COIN campaign requires large amounts of security forces to secure and then hold a location to keep it safe from the influence of The three problems just discussed were all caused by the almost total lack of Iraqi security forces at the beginning of the insurgency. Therefore, one might determine that U.S. "Boots on the Ground" if supplemented with HN forces would work effectively in a counterinsurgency. In other words, a HN security force could fill in the gaps of U.S.
capabilities to make a good COIN force. However, there are some other issues that occur with "Boots on the Ground" that can significantly hinder a COIN campaign.
As already discussed, the engagement of the HN government and people in a counterinsurgency is a key to winning. In Iraq this was a big problem. The bipartisan congressional commission, The Iraq Study Group, released a report in 2006 that said, "Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their own future." 77 The commission went on to indicate that the presence of an open-ended U.S. troop commitment was causing the Iraqi government to not make the hard calls necessary to combat the insurgency. 78 In essence, for many Iraqis this was "America's War" and both the cost and the blame for lack of progress belonged to the United States. The incentive to become engaged was moderated by the mere presence of large quantities of U.S.
troops.
Another detriment to U.S. "Boots on the Ground" in the Iraqi counterinsurgency was the fact that not only did their presence discourage engagement of the population but the U.S. presence became a core grievance of the insurgency. JP 3-24 says that "eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers." 79 It goes on to point out that a mere foreign presence is a potential core grievance that can be manipulated by the insurgents to serve their purpose. 80 This is exactly what happened in Iraq. A RAND study noted that the only clear goal of the Iraqi insurgency was opposition to the United States and its allies. 81 Although the lack of security and services were the initial core grievances and the proximate cause of the insurgency, the insurgents were able to manipulate resentment and fear into a new core grievance, the presence of U.S. troops. This is This paper has pointed out many difficulties with U.S. "Boots on the Ground" in a counterinsurgency. However, probably the biggest detriment to having U.S. "Boots on the Ground" is the influence of U.S. public opinion. All the aforementioned issues with "Boots on the Ground" can potentially be resolved with sufficient amounts of quality troops and proficient leaders if there are sufficient resources, time and will to overcome these obstacles. There are historical examples of successful foreign "Boots on the Ground" in counterinsurgencies. These include the two most studied, the U.S. in the Iraq is another example of how U.S. public opinion significantly influenced the COIN campaign. In the initial stages of the COIN campaign, there was great pressure from the Bush administration to train new Iraqi security forces quickly so the U.S. troops could be brought home as soon as possible. Unfortunately this resulted in training that that was quick but substandard. 88 This was highlighted by the poor performance of Iraqi troops in the first battle of Fallujah. 89 Shortly afterwards, the training program was revamped. 90 An even more vivid example of the influence of U.S. public opinion was the U.S. acceptable. In addition, since it was U.S. troops, foreigners, that had burned the books, it made it easier for the insurgents to play upon the fears and cultural sensitivities of the local population.
Recommendations and Conclusion U.S. "Boots on the Ground" in a foreign counterinsurgency should be avoided if at all possible. Building Partnership Capacity is a much better option that yields most the benefits of U.S. "Boots on the Ground" without all the disadvantages.
The position of the United States as a globally engaged superpower almost guarantees that it will be involved in conflict around the world. As the United States currently has no peer and very few near peer competitors in the military arena, it is likely that future adversaries will resort to terrorism or insurgency.
The U.S. involvement in the Colombian counterinsurgency from 2002 to the present demonstrates how building partnership capacity can be a very successful tool in combating an insurgency. The United States commitment of less than 800 troops and slightly more than 8 billion dollars has had dramatic positive results. 94 Colombia is a 25 strong and stable country in the region with strong ties to the United States both politically and economically.
On the other hand, the U.S. involvement in the Iraqi counterinsurgency has not produced very good results for the United States or the region. Iraq has a very fragile government which is strongly influenced by Iran. In addition, the United States, despite having spent over 800 billion dollars and the lives of over 4,000 troops with over 40,000
wounded, does not have an ally or even a friend in Iraq. 
